The Struggle for Land in the Middle East and Central Asia by Hierman, Brent
More than a hundred years after the publication of Leo Tolstoy’s How Much Land Does a 
Man Need? these words still capture the desire for land ownership felt by many low-income 
farmers in the Middle East and Central Asia. In both regions, many of these individuals still 
hope to own more land, or in some cases, any land at all. 
Over the past several decades, market-oriented reforms in post-Soviet Central Asia and the 
Middle East have redefined the relationship between low-income farmers and the 
government. In some cases, these reforms have led to the formal acquisition of property rights, 
and the opportunity for small farmers to acquire productive lands. In other cases, however, 
reforms have done the opposite and cost individuals’ their property. In many cases, these 
measures have strengthened economic elites, at the expense of low-income farm workers, who 
are all too aware of this destructive dynamic.   
The Struggle for Land !
The market-oriented reforms of recent decades are not the first time state agricultural policies 
have reshaped rural societies in Central Asia and the Middle East, or raised concerns amongst 
poor farmers.  
This is no more apparent than in the Soviet Union’s collectivization campaign in Central Asia 
from 1929-1933, which sought to modernize rural life by eradicating private farming and 
establishing collective, state-controlled farms. Through the course of this campaign, at least a 
million Kazakhs, out of a population of around 4 million, perished as a result of famine. 
Between the 1960s and the fall of communism, these collective farms were transformed into an 
arm of the Soviet welfare state.  
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“IN MANY CASES,  MARKET-ORIENTED LAND REFORMS HAVE STRENGTHENED
ECONOMIC ELITES,  AT THE EXPENSE OF LOW-INCOME FARM WORKERS” 
“Busy as we are from childhood tilling Mother Earth, we peasants have no time 
to let any nonsense settle in our heads. Our only trouble is that we haven't land 
enough. If I had plenty of land, I shouldn't fear the Devil himself!" 
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As Sheila Fitzpatrick describes in her book, Stalin’s Peasants, during this period, the inherent 
risk of financial ruin due to crop failure was eliminated for collective farmers. While there was 
no hope of getting rich, collective famers had a guaranteed income regardless of their 
agricultural output.  
Although transformative, agricultural reforms in the 
Middle East were never as sweeping or violent as the 
Soviet Union’s collectivization campaigns. Two of the 
most extensive regional initiatives occurred in Egypt and 
Syria. In both cases, ruling regimes claimed their reforms 
responded to demands from the rural poor for a more 
equitable distribution of farmland.  
In 1952, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a land reform campaign aimed at 
alleviating tremendous inequality in land ownership by establishing a land ceiling of 200 
feddans (84 hectares) per person; all land above the ceiling was redistributed to landless 
households.  Even more importantly, as Roy Prosterman has pointed out, registered tenancy 
laws were introduced, which supported the landless through rent price fixing and protection 
from eviction. 
“AGRICULTURAL REFORMS IN
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NEVER AS SWEEPING OR 
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UNION’S COLLECTIVIZATION
CAMPAIGNS” 
!
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In Syria, the Baathist regime began a land reform process in 
1958, which combined aspects of the Soviet and Egyptian 
models. As in Egypt, land ceilings reduced the influence of 
massive estates and provided the state with excess land to 
redistribute to the landless poor. In exchange for complying 
with the state’s agricultural plan, these newly landed farmers 
were able to access subsidized inputs, such as fertilizer, seeds, 
and fuel, as well as credit through state-organized cooperatives. 
In addition to these quasi-private farms, Syria created a number of state farms with Soviet 
support that were intended to show off modern, socialist farming techniques. 
State Withdrawal in the Middle East !
Egypt and Syria’s commitment to explicitly pro-poor agricultural 
policies began to weaken in the latter half of the 20th century. In 
response to a fiscal crisis in the 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar al-
Sadat began pursuing a policy of infitah (openness), which reduced 
the role of the public sector in the economy and relied on domestic 
and international investment. As Raymond Hinnebusch has noted, 
the push for privatization, which spread from Egypt throughout the 
Arab world, was accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the resulting loss of Soviet aid.  
By the mid-1980s, agricultural privatization represented a counterrevolution in the Egyptian 
countryside, as private sector investment was sought to offset the state’s withdrawal from key 
components of the agricultural sector. Among the most significant aspects of Egypt’s land 
counter-revolution was a law passed in 1992, which reversed tenancy protections that had been 
in place since the 1952 land reform. The new law gave landlords the power to raise rents and 
evict tenants, and, as a result, led to sharp increases in rental prices and a rise in landlessness. 
Unsurprisingly, the law was linked to numerous disputes between farmers and landlords. 
Economic liberalization represented a substantial shift in the 
social contract between the state and the Egyptian people. While 
the Nasser regime had established patronage networks with the 
rural poor, under Hosni Mubarak, it was the landowners who 
were clients of the regime. With a large proportion of the rural 
population feeling increasingly alienated, the Mubarak regime’s 
legitimacy was undermined and the groundwork for the 2011 
revolution was laid.  
Although agricultural reforms in Syria were more modest than those in Egypt, they had 
significant effects on rural society. In 2000, the regime of Bashar al-Assad privatized all state 
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lands. This led to the dissolution of state farms and the distribution of land to eligible parties, 
including to former owners and farm workers. This development underscored the failure of 
state farms to efficiently produce crops and indoctrinate the rural population. 
The Syrian regime also significantly cut subsidies and credits that had been provided to 
independent farmers involved in cooperative farming. Reductions in credit from the state-run 
Agricultural and Cooperative Bank were not, however adequately offset by private sector 
lending options. In line with the government’s tenth five-year plan, launched in 2005, cuts were 
made to subsidies on fertilizer and fuel, which were critical to operating irrigation pumps.  
These changes occurred during a period of acute agricultural crisis brought on by a severe 
drought across much of the country. The Syrian government’s inept response to the drought 
would become one of the main triggers of the current civil war, a conflict that is, at least 
partially, motivated by socio-economic inequality and discontent with the country’s powerful 
economic elite.  
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“THIS UNDERSCORED THE FAILURE OF THE STATE FARMS BOTH TO EFFICIENTLY
PRODUCE CROPS AND INDOCTRINATE THE RURAL POPULATION” 
!
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The Central  Asian Experience !
While the Soviet Union’s collapse accelerated the pace of land reforms in the Middle East, it 
did not trigger it. In Central Asia, however, agricultural reforms resulted directly from the 
dissolution of the Soviet state, and the loss of subsidies from Moscow.  
The speed at which collective farms were dissolved and land 
made available to farmers has varied across the region. While 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had privatized their old state-owned 
lands by 2003, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the government 
continues to own all land, which is leased to private individuals 
for long-term use. As is often the case, Turkmenistan is an outlier 
in the region, and has its own peculiar kind of private ownership 
of land — land owners are not permitted to sell or give their 
property away, which severely limits its economic utility.  
Similarly to the Middle East, many rural farmers in Central Asia believe the process of 
decollectivization has disproportionately benefitted the wealthy.  
In the summer of 2014, I conducted a small survey of eighty-one people in Tajikistan from ten 
randomly selected villages. The results revealed some dissatisfaction with the land reform 
process. One question in particular helped explain these sentiments. I asked respondents who 
would receive the bigger land share, if both applied at the same time, a wealthy businessman 
or a common farmer. An overwhelming majority of respondents (73.17%) indicated that a 
wealthy businessman would likely receive the larger share, while only 6.1% of respondents 
believed it would go to the common farmer.  
The intuition reflected in these responses is that wealthy, well-connected elites are 
manipulating the rules to dispossess average farmers of their land. This fear has been openly 
articulated in debates in Tajikistan over legislation to permit the sale of land use rights, and, in 
Kazakhstan, over land privatization. In the Kazakhstani debate, critics argued the land code 
should be renamed the “Code on Latifundia,” the Roman and South American term for large 
estates dominated by a single landlord.  
The Continued Politicization of Land !
This is all to say that the state’s withdrawal from parts of the agricultural sector in both the 
Middle East and Central Asia has changed the locus of political power, but has not 
“THE INTUITION IS THAT WEALTHY, WELL-CONNECTED ELITES ARE
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!
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depoliticized economic relations. While some small farmers have certainly benefitted from 
these reforms, others have struggled. For many in both regions, well-connected economic 
elites have replaced state bureaucracies as the dominant political actors.  
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